Suicide, Liberty and Our Imperfect Constitution: An Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court\u27s Entanglement in Decisions to Terminate Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment by Kline, Terrance A.
Campbell Law Review
Volume 14
Issue 1 Winter 1991 Article 2
January 1991
Suicide, Liberty and Our Imperfect Constitution:
An Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Supreme
Court's Entanglement in Decisions to Terminate
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment
Terrance A. Kline
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Medical
Jurisprudence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law.
Recommended Citation
Terrance A. Kline, Suicide, Liberty and Our Imperfect Constitution: An Analysis of the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court's Entanglement in
Decisions to Terminate Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 14 Campbell L. Rev. 69 (1991).
SUICIDE, LIBERTY AND OUR
IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGITIMACY OF
THE SUPREME COURT'S
ENTANGLEMENT IN DECISIONS TO
TERMINATE LIFE-SUSTAINING
MEDICAL TREATMENT
TERRANCE A. KLINE*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 70
II. CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF
H E ALT H ........ .... .... .... ... .. ... ..... ...... .. 7 1
III. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S
RECOGNITION OF A RIGHT TO SUICIDE UNDER THE
C ONSTITUTION .................................... 76
A. The Notion of Rights Under the Constitution . 77
B. Expanding the Constitutional Scheme of Rights
With Substantive Due Process ................. 80
C. Devising a Right to Privacy Under the
C onstitution ..................... ........... 84
D. Finding a Right to Suicide in Substantive Due
Process ..................................... 87
1. Proscriptions Against Suicide in Early
American Common Law ................. 88
2. The Emergence of a Common Law Tort
Remedy for Unwanted Medical Treatment 90
3. Extrapolating the Tort Remedy Into a
Right to Suicide? ...................... . 91
IV. THE PRUDENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE 93
* B.A. 1981, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D. 1985, University of
Pittsburgh School of Law; LL.M. (in taxation) 1989, Temple University School of
Law; LL.M. 1991, Columbia University School of Law. The author is an attorney
with the law firm of Kassab, Archbold, Jackson, & O'Brien, Media, Pennsylvania.
1
Kline: Suicide, Liberty and Our Imperfect Constitution: An Analysis of t
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
A. State Responses to Advancements in Scientific
Prolongation of Life ......................... " 94
B. The Effect of the Supreme Court Decision in
Cruzan on the Development of State Law ..... 99
V . C ONCLUSION ..................................... 102
I. INTRODUCTION
Twentieth-century advances in medical technology have sus-
tained productive, meaningful lives for many individuals who, in
earlier times, would have had no chance of recovery from serious
illness. Yet, medical technology has also created its own casualties
by sustaining the lives of many individuals beyond the limits of
human dignity. The casualties to which I refer are those persons
who endure life in a persistent vegetative state'-those who have
neither cognizance of their environment nor knowledge of the iden-
tity of their family and friends; those who have no sense of pain or
pleasure; those who are kept alive by artificial respiration, nutri-
tion and hydration; those who have no chance of regaining their
mental faculties or physical locomotion; those who, through no
fault of their own, impart emotional suffering upon their families
and financial burdens upon society; and those who, given a choice,
probably would choose to terminate life-sustaining measures.
These casualties of medical science have compelled our state
legislatures and state courts to examine the proper role of the state
government in decisions relating to the termination of life-sus-
taining medical treatment.2 Discerning the proper governmental
role, however, has not been an easy task. The decision to terminate
life-sustaining medical treatment implicates the states' interests in
1. The term persistent vegetative state "'describes a body which is function-
ing entirely in terms of its internal controls. It maintains temperature. It main-
tains heart beat and pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It
maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned re-
sponses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness
of the surroundings in a learned manner.'" In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529
A.2d 434, 438 (1987)(quoting Dr. Fred Plum). See generally Cranford, The Per-
sistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 27; Walshe & Leonard, Persistent Vegeta-
tive State: Extension of the Syndrome to Include Chronic Disorders, 42
ARCHIVES OF NEUROLOGY 1045 (1985).
2. Life sustaining medical treatment has been defined as "any medical inter-
vention that is administered to a patient in order to prolong life and delay death."
THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING
TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING 140 (1987).
[Vol. 14:69
2
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol14/iss1/2
RIGHT To DIE
preserving and protecting life as well as considerations of morality,
religion and individual autonomy. Remarkably, during the past fif-
teen years, the states have proffered solutions to the perplexing
problem, either through statutes or case law or, more commonly,
through a mixture of both.3 Subject to limitations and exceptions,
the states have determined that persons who exist in a persistent
vegetative state may refuse life-sustaining medical treatment even
though the refusal of treatment results in death.'
As the law developed in the states, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in its 1990 opinion in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Department of Health,5 determined that there exists a right to ter-
minate life-sustaining medical treatment under the United States
Constitution.' As a result of the decision, new uncertainties have
been infused into the state legislative and judicial responses to the
issue.
After examining the Cruzan decision below, I probe the con-
stitutional legitimacy and the prudence of the Supreme Court's
role in decisions relating to the termination of life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment. I conclude that the Court in Cruzan, though exercis-
ing some self-restraint, has improperly usurped powers relegated to
the states and has thereby perilously interfered with the develop-
ment of sensitive state law.
II. CRUZAN v. DIRECTOR, MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
A young Nancy Cruzan suffered injuries in an automobile acci-
dent that left her incompetent and in a persistent vegetative state.
She was kept alive in a Missouri state hospital by food and water
ingested through surgically implanted tubes. Medical experts testi-
fied that Nancy Cruzan could have lived for thirty years or more in
her condition; they also acknowledged that she had virtually no
chance of recovering from her vegetative state.7
After the dim prognosis, Nancy Cruzan's parents, as her
guardians, sought a court order to remove the feeding tubes, an
action that all agreed would lead to her death. A state trial court
granted the order on the basis that Nancy Cruzan (via her guardi-
3. See infra text accompanying notes 118-155.
4. Id.
5. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
6. See infra text accompanying note 17.
7. See Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1989), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990).
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ans) had a privacy right under the Missouri and United States
Constitutions to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment.8 The
court also found that Nancy Cruzan would not have wanted to
continue living in a vegetative condition based upon the testimony
of a former roommate who claimed that, prior to her accident,
Nancy Cruzan had said that she would not wish to 'continue her
life unless she could live at least halfway normally."
The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the order, refusing to
find a right to privacy under either the state or the federal Consti-
tution that would sanction the termination of Nancy Cruzan's life-
sustaining medical treatment."0 The court did not challenge the
right under the Missouri living will statute to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, although the court did determine that such
medical treatment could be refused only upon a finding by the
court of clear and convincing evidence of the patient's intent to
refuse such treatment.11 The court found that the testimony of
Nancy Cruzan's roommate was unreliable for determining her in-
tent to terminate medical treatment.12 Moreover, the court denied
Nancy Cruzan's parents the right to make the decision to termi-
nate treatment on the basis of their substituted judgment. 13
By a five-four vote, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed.14 The narrow question before the Court was whether the
Missouri high court erred in requiring "clear and convincing" evi-
dence from Nancy Cruzan herself of her desire to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment under such circumstances. 5 After
8. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990)(App. to Petition for Cert. at 99).
9. Id., App. to Petition for Cert. at 97.
10. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 417-418.
11. Id. at 425.
12. Id. at 426.
13. In August, 1990, the parents of Nancy Cruzan petitioned the Missouri
state trial court for a re-hearing to present new evidence concerning their daugh-
ter's intention to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Three of Nancy'
Cruzan's former co-workers testified that Nancy Cruzan said to them that she
would never want to "live like a vegetable." N.Y. Times, December 27, 1990, at 1,
col. 1. On December 14, 1990, the trial court determined that the new testimony
demonstrated the existence of clear and convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's
intent to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Nancy Cruzan's feeding tubes
were removed on December 14, 1990. She died on December 26, 1990, eight years
after the automobile accident which left her in a vegetative condition.
14. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2841.
15. Id. Many states have adopted the "substituted judgment" standard
whereby court-appointed guardians are recognized to make treatment decisions
[Vol. 14:69
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weighing Nancy Cruzan's apparent right to refuse medical treat-
ment against the State of Missouri's interest in the protection and
preservation of human life, the Court determined that "Missouri
may legitimately seek to safeguard the personal element of [the
choice between life and death] through the imposition of height-
ened evidentiary requirements." 6
The larger, more significant question before the Court was
whether the Constitution imparts a right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, de-
clared that one could infer from the Court's prior decisions that "a
competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment ... '" But, Rehnquist
continued, "determining that a person has a 'liberty interest' under
the Due Process Clause does not end the inquiry; 'whether respon-
dent's constitutional rights have been violated must be determined
by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state
interests.' "8
Although the Court implicitly recognized a new but limited
constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, the
Court refused to find a fundamental right to do so, thus avoiding
the necessity of applying the heightened judicial scrutiny that nor-
mally accompanies a fundamental right. 9 In footnote seven, the
Court declared that "[a]lthough many state courts have held that a
right to refuse treatment is encompassed by a generalized constitu-
on behalf of the incompetent. In those states, a guardian's substituted judgment
can be honored by the courts on the theory that the guardian acts in the incompe-
tent's best interest. Missouri has not adopted such a standard but instead re-
quires the incompetent herself (prior to her incompetency) to show clearly her
intent to refuse medical treatment.
16. Id. at 2852-53.
We think it self-evident that the interests at stake in the instant pro-
ceedings are more substantial, both on an individual and societal level,
than those involved in a run-of-the-mine civil dispute. But not only does
the standard of proof reflect the importance of a particular adjudication,
it also serves as 'a societal judgment about how the risk of error should
be distributed between the litigants.' The more stringent the burden of
proof a party must bear, the more that party bears the risk of an errone-
ous decision. We believe that Missouri may permissibly place an in-
creased risk of an erroneous decision on those seeking to terminate an
incompetent individual's life-sustaining treatment.
Id. at 2854 (citations omitted).
17. Id. at 2851.
18. Id. at 2851-2852 (footnote omitted).
19. Id.
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tional right of privacy, we have never so held. We believe this issue
is more properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest. 20
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor indicated her
agreement that "a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions ...
and that the refusal of artificially delivered food and water is en-
compassed within that liberty interest."'2' Justice O'Connor reiter-
ated the majority's view that requiring a competent adult to un-
dergo life-sustaining medical treatment against his or her will
"burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine
the course of her own treatment. Accordingly, the liberty guaran-
teed by the Due Process Clause must protect, if it protects any-
thing, an individual's deeply personal decision to reject medical
treatment, including the artificial delivery of food and water. '22
While it is unclear from Justice O'Connor's concurrence
whether she would recognize a broader liberty right to refuse medi-
cal treatment, Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, imparts no
constitutional right whatsoever in a person's decision to terminate
life-sustaining medical treatment because, he says, no such right
exists under the Constitution.23 Scalia asserts that, under the
Court's traditional substantive due process analysis, a fundamental
constitutional right-such as the asserted right to refuse medical
treatment-must at least be "'so rooted in our tradition that it
may be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty.' "24 Scalia observed that the termination of life-sus-
taining medical treatment that causes a person's death before na-
ture and science would otherwise allow is suicide, the regulation of
which has always been within the police powers of the states:25
While I agree with the Court's analysis today," and therefore
join in its opinion, I would have preferred that we announce,
20. Id. at 2851 n.7.
21. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 2857.
23. Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone &
Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DuQ. L. REV. 1, 100 (1985) (quoting
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
25. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
26. While Justice Scalia asserts that he agrees with the majority's analysis,
his concurring opinion seems to repudiate Justice Rehnquist's analysis which rec-
ognizes a constitutional right to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment.
[Vol. 14:69
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clearly and promptly, that the federal courts have no business in
this field; that American law has always accorded the State the
power to prevent, by force if necessary, suicide-including suicide
by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve
one's life; that the point at which life becomes 'worthless,' and the
point at which the means necessary to preserve it become 'ex-
traordinary' or 'inappropriate,' are neither set forth in the Consti-
tution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better
than they are known to nine people picked at random from the
Kansas City telephone directory ', and hence, that even when it is
demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that a patient no
longer wishes certain measures to be taken to preserve her life, it
is up to the citizens of Missouri to decide, through their elected
representatives, whether that wish will be honored. It is quite im-
possible (because the Constitution says nothing about the matter)
that those citizens will decide upon a line less lawful than the one
we would choose; and it is unlikely (because we know no more
about 'life-and-death' than they do) that they will decide upon a
line less reasonable. '
Justices Brennan and Stevens each filed dissents antithetical
to Scalia's plea for judicial self-restraint. Justice Brennan avowed
that Nancy Cruzan (or her surrogate) has a fundamental right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, a right that Missouri
could not overcome by its general interest in the preservation and
protection of life. 8 According to Justice Brennan, Missouri could
legitimately interfere with a patient's fundamental right to refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment only to impose "procedural re-
quirements that serve to enhance the accuracy of a determination
of Nancy Cruzan's wishes ... ."29 Justice Brennan asserted that
the state has no interest in a person's life that could outweigh his
or her choice to avoid medical treatment.3 0 Similarly, Justice Ste-
vens viewed the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment as
a fundamental liberty that prevails over any state policy that ig-
nores "the best interests of the individual, especially when but-
tressed by the interests of all related third parties . .3.1.
27. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 2863-2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2871.
30. Id. at 2870.
31. Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1991]
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III. THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SUPREME COURT'S RECOGNITION OF A
RIGHT TO SUICIDE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
32
As a result of the Cruzan decision, a competent person now
seems to possess a limited constitutional right to refuse life-sus-
taining medical treatment under the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. If such a right exists under the Constitu-
tion-, as the Supreme Court has determined, the Court has acted
within its proper boundaries of judicial review and the conse-
quences of its decision will be endured; but if no such right exists,
then the Court has improperly usurped the power of the states to
make laws regulating the health, welfare and morals of their
citizens.
Admittedly, it is no easy task to identify rights that deserve
constitutional protection. With regard to individual rights, the
Constitution is a murky document, devoid of clarity and certainty.
Rational individuals often ascribe different meanings to the same
words and phrases in the Constitution. Intellectuals engage in dis-
course attempting to convince others that the Constitution reflects
a particular point of view. Supreme Court Justices opine persua-
sively that the Constitution means one thing or another.
Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulty and the confusion inher-
ent in constitutional interpretation lies the true meaning of the
Constitution-a true meaning that can be ascertained in a nation
that follows the rule of law. In this section, I seek the true meaning
of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to deter-
mine whether it encompasses a right to refuse life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment. To that end, I examine below the historical origins
32. A word about nomenclature. Over the past fifteen years, the commenta-
tors have referred imprecisely to a person's right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment in terms of a "right to die." I hesitate to perpetuate the phrase because
it connotes something that it is not. In the literature, the "right to die" generally
means that a person who is terminally ill or in a vegetative condition has some
legally enforceable right to decide for himself or herself whether to die sooner
than nature and science would otherwise allow. Yet, the phrase "right to die"
implies a broader, more substantive right to personal autonomy and destination
which has not until recently existed in the law. The termination of life-sustaining
medical treatment is a deliberate termination of one's own life prior to its natural
or scientific ending. Such an act is suicide. If government determines that a per-
son has a right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment, government confers a
right to suicide. I refer to this more exculpatory concept of suicide as "justifiable
suicide" because I believe that the phrase more aptly describes the legal right to
terminate life-sustaining medical treatment than the more ambiguous notion of
the "right to die."
[Vol. 14:69
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of rights under the Constitution and show how those rights have
evolved into a dubious constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment.
A. The Notion of Rights Under the Constitution
Whether a right to suicide exists under the Constitution de-
pends upon a fair interpretation of the pertinent provisions of the
Constitution and its amendments in accordance with the principles
intended by the ratifiers. 33 Although rights were preemiient in the
Declaration of Independence, the exposition of rights in the United
States Constitutionwas given scant attention. 4 The reason for this
can be traced to the framers' intent to produce a Constitution to
function primarily as a framework for a limited federal govern-
33. I recognize that the inquiry into whether the Court's decision in Cruzan
was a legitimate exercise of constitutional power must be informed by some the-
ory of constitutional law. While plentiful theories abound, I am compelled to ap-
ply the only neutral theory of constitutional adjudication which I regard as com-
porting with the role of the Supreme Court in our constitutional republic-the
theory of original understanding. I do not undertake here to defend or propound
the notion of original understanding since that task has been ably accomplished
elsewhere. See generally BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 363-372 (1977); BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA (1990); Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353
(1981); and Scalia, Originalism, The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
Suffice it to say that the theory's logic-that "a judge is to apply the Constitution
according to the principles intended by those who ratified the document"-seems
to me unassailable. I find unconvincing competing theories of constitutional adju-
dication which rely upon the notion that the Constitution is an open-ended docu-
ment which should be "molded to the views of contemporary society." As I see it,
the danger in such theories is that they impart into the Constitution a notion of
morality which may be used by a Justice of the Supreme Court to obtain a de-
sired political result. This enables a Justice to wield power to make public policy
which has been reserved under our constitutional scheme either to other branches
of the federal government or to the states.
34. The Constitution is not entirely devoid of rights. For example, Article I,
section 9 provides that "[t]he privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it." Likewise,'the same section provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto Law shall be passed." Section 10 of Article I provides that "[n]o State
shall.. .pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obli-
gation of Contracts. . . ." Section 2 of Article III provides that "[tihe trial of all
Crimes... shall be by Jury. . . ." And Article IV, section 2 provides that "[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citi-
zens in the several states."
1991]
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ment. 5 Explicit in the constitutional arrangement was the framers'
recognition that most rights and powers would be retained by the
states and the people, and not by the federal government.36
Like the Constitution, the Bill of Rights originally offered few
significant protections for civil liberties. Although the Bill of
Rights was conceived as a "rights" document, it was neither a com-
prehensive rights document nor an affirmative rights document.
For example, the Bill of Rights contained no provisions dealing
with slavery, equality, consent of the governed, the right to vote, or
liberty, even though many of these rights were advanced in the
bills of rights of the various states, such as Virginia and Massachu-
setts, many of which were ratified prior to the federal Bill of
Rights. 37 The Bill of Rights was designed to protect against the
illegitimate use of power by the federal government; it was not
designed to limit or restrict the powers and rights of the states or
private individuals.3 s
35. "But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less applicable to
a constitution like that under consideration, which is merely intended to regulate
the general political interests of the nation, than to one which has the regulation
of every species of personal and private concerns." THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A.
Hamilton).
36. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[tihe powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people."
37. I offer here only a sampling of the affirmative rights granted under the
Virginia and Massachusetts bills of rights. The Virginia bill of rights, adopted in
1776, provided, inter alia, that: "all men are by nature equally free" (Section 1);
"all men ... have the right of suffrage" (Section 6); "freedom of the press ... can
never be restrained" (Section 12); "all men are equally entitled to the free exer-
cise of religion" (Section 16). See VA. CONST. of 1776. Likewise, the Massachusetts
bill of rights, adopted in 1780, provided, inter alia, that: "All men are born free
and equal" (Article I); "all the inhabitants... have an equal right to elect officers"
(Article IX); "The liberty of the press [ought not] be restrained" (Article XVI).
See MASS. CONST. of 1780. None of these rights were imparted affirmatively in the
United States Bill of Rights. See also the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of
Citizens (1789), prefixed to FRENCH CONST. of 1791 which, like the bills of rights of
the states, was heavily rights oriented. For a discussion of the modern relation-
ship between the state and federal bills of rights, see generally Grad, The Legis-
lative Drafting Research Fund of Columbia University, Constitutions of the
United States: National and State 117-136 (January 1980).
38. Justice Brennan reminds us that "the Federal Bill was enacted to place
limits on the federal government while state bills are widely perceived as granting
affirmative rights to citizens." Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The
Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 535, 549 (1986).
[Vol. 14:69
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All of the foregoing was not apparent to Justice Samuel Chase,
who, in 1798, prior to his impeachment, declared in Calder v.
Bull" that the Constitution prohibited a legislature from enacting
a law that takes "property from A and gives it to B."'40 Notwith-
standing that the Constitution itself imposed no such proscription,
Chase found that such a law "is against all reason and justice""
and is therefore forbidden under "the general principles of law and
reason."2 Chase's reliance upon natural law was repudiated in an
opinion by Justice Iredell:
[If] the Legislatuie of the Union, or the Legislature of any mem-
ber of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of
their constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be
void, merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the prin-
ciples of natural justice. The ideas of natural justice are regulated
by no fixed standard: the ablest and the purest men have differed
upon the subject; and all that the Court could properly say, in
such an event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an
equal right of opinion) had passed an act which, in the opinion of
the judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natu-
ral justice.43
Perhaps Chase's reliance on natural law would have been rep-
utable if the Constitution had been conceived as a natural law doc-
ument. The evidence shows, however, that the Constitution was in-
tended as a positive law document, not as one with inherent
natural rights. "The Founders were deeply committed to positiv-
ism, as is attested by their resort to written constitutions-positive
law. Adams, Jefferson, Wilson, Madison and Hamilton . . . were
seldom, if ever, guilty of confusing law with natural right. ' 44 And
although mention of the natural law would creep into Supreme
Court decisions in the early days of the republic, Chief Justice
Marshall would finally renounce the idea in M'Culloch v. Mary-
land,45 proclaiming that the natural law has no place in the Su-
preme Court's constitutional jurisprudence.46
39. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
40. Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388 (emphasis added).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring).
44. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 252 (1977)(see also n. 15, at 252 and 393-396).
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
46. Id. Even earlier, in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall declared
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B. Expanding the Constitutional Scheme of Rights With Sub-
stantive Due Process47
With the ratification of the three Civil War amendments, the
that the Constitution is law and that the role of the Supreme Court is to interpret
the law under the confines of the textual provisions of the Constitution:
The powers of the legislature are defined, and limited; and that those
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To
what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation
committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those
intended to be restrained? ... [T]he framers of the constitution contem-
plated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts, as well as
of the legislature.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 179-80 (1803).
47. In addition to the constitutional theory of substantive due process dis-
cussed hereinafter; rights under the Constitution have been expanded under at
least two other constitutional theories which I mention only briefly here. First, the
Court has found persuasive the argument that the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment integrates some or all of the Bill of Rights such that they have
become applicable to the states in addition to the federal government. Although it
is doubtful that the ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment intended that the fed-
eral Bill of Rights be made applicable to the states, the Court has accepted the
notion and has struck down countless state laws as a result thereof. See, e.g., BER-
GER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 134-156 (1977). Second, some commentators have speculated that the
ninth amendment may serve as the basis for enforceable natural rights under the
Constitution. See, e.g., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988). Such a theory of rights has never been ac-
cepted by the Supreme Court, although Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut relies heavily upon the ninth amendment. Even there,
Justice Stewart, in his dissenting opinion, rather disavows the idea: "The Ninth
Amendment, like its companion the Tenth, which this Court held 'states but a
truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered,' was framed by James
Madison and adopted by the States simply to make clear that the adoption of the
Bill of Rights did not alter the plan that the Federal Government was to be a
government of express and limited powers, and that all rights and powers not
delegated to it were retained by the people and the individual States." Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 529-530 (1965)(Stewart, J., dissenting)(citations omit-
ted). "There is almost no history that would indicate what the ninth amendment
was intended to accomplish. But nothing about it suggests that it is a warrant for
judges to create constitutional rights not mentioned in the Constitution." BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 183 (1990).
In sophisticated legal circles mentioning the Ninth Amendment is a
surefire way to get a laugh .... It's true that read for what it says the
Ninth Amendment seems open-textured enough to support almost any-
thing one might wish to argue, and that can get pretty scary. But this is
equally true of the 'substantive due process' concept, which is generally
accepted, albeit with some misgivings, in the selfsame sophisticated
[Vol. 14:69
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infusion of natural law into constitutional jurisprudence recurred.
The purpose of the amendments was to ensure that recently freed
slaves received the same civil and political rights as free whites. 48
The language of the thirteenth and fifteenth amendments was ex-
pressly limited to the slavery issues. But the language of the four-
teenth amendment was not so limited:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.4 9
The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment mirrored that of the fifth amendment, which has gen-
erally been construed to mean that a state must grant the same
civil and political rights to noncitizens as it does to its own citi-
zens.6 0 Although there appears to be some merit in the argument
circles.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34 (1980).
48. The rationale for the ratification of the Civil War amendments was ex-
pressed by Justice Miller in the Slaughter-House Cases:
We repeat, then, in the light of this recapitulation of the events [of the
Civil War amendments], almost too recent to be called history, but which
are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of the language
of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the one per-
vading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean
-the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that
freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from
the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion
over him.
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 71 (1873).
49. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
50. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 318 (3d ed. 1986).
However, as the aforesaid authors point out, the privileges and immunities clause
of the fourteenth amendment, unlike the fifth amendment, "protects very few
rights." Id. at 319. The fourteenth amendment privileges and immunities clause
protects only "those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government; it
does not protect those rights which relate only to state citizenship. Therefore, the
clause only refers to uniquely federal rights, such as the right to petition Con-
gress, the right to vote in federal elections, the right to interstate travel or com-
merce, the right to enter federal lands, or the rights of a citizen while in the cus-
tody of federal officers." Id. at 319 (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36 (1873)). And Professor Tribe has remarked that "in at least one respect
the fourteenth amendment privileges or immunities clause and its ancestor in ar-
ticle IV are much alike: courts rarely rely upon either to protect the privileges of
13
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that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment was intended to propound substantive rights,5" its actual
meaning has irrefutably been determined to add nothing of sub-
stance to the Constitution.2
Similarly, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
was commonly understood to annex no substantive rights to the
Constitution. 3 Neither the language of the provision itself nor the
history of its ratification suggests that any substantive rights were
intended.5 4 As the phrase "due process" implies, the aim of the
provision was to ensure fair and lawful procedures.5" "What re-
corded comment there was at the time of replication in the Four-
teenth Amendment is devoid of any reference that gives the provi-
sion more than a procedural connotation."56 Notwithstanding the
clarity of the language and the ratifiers' intent, the fourteenth
amendment "became and has remained the great engine of judicial
power. ' 57 Generations of legal technicians and courts would resort
to the fourteenth amendment to ascertain natural rights not other-
wise identifiable in the text of the Constitution. The catchphrase
would become "substantive due process," and the concept would
be employed by the Supreme Court time and again to strike down
state laws that did not comport with the Court's notion of natural
justice.
For instance, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,58 the Supreme Court
found unconstitutional a Louisiana state statute that prohibited its
citizens from contracting for insurance from any company not
chartered by the State of Louisiana. Justice Peckham, writing for
the Court, said that such prohibitions impinge upon the liberty
provision of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
The liberty mentioned in [the fourteenth amendment] means
not only the right of the citizen to be free from the mere physical
restraint of his person, as by incarceration, but the term is
citizens, state or federal." TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 548 (2d ed.
1988).
51. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 123 (Bradley, J., dis-
senting). See also ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30 (1980).
52. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
53. See generally ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14-21 (1980).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 15.
56. Id.
57. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 36 (1990).
58. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
[Vol. 14:69
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deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoy-
ment of all his faculties; to be free to use them in all lawful ways;
to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any law-
ful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that
purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, neces-
sary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion
the purposes above mentioned. 9
In Lochner v. New York, 60 the Supreme Court reviewed the
constitutionality of a New York statute that placed restrictions on
working hours for bakers. The statute was designed to protect the
health, safety and welfare of bakers, normally powers well within
the states exhaustive police powers. But the Court struck down the
statute on the basis that it interfered with a constitutional right to
freedom of contract, a right that the Court found under the liberty
provision of the due process clause."1 In both Allgeyer and Loch-
ner, the Supreme Court resorted to notions of natural justice to
trump the power of the state to enact economic regulations not
otherwise barred by the Constitution.
In the 1930s, after decades of adherence to a doctrine of "eco-
nomic" substantive due process that was nowhere to be found in
the text of the Constitution, the Supreme Court repudiated the
doctrine in Nebbia v. New York 62 (upholding a law that fixed the
selling price for milk) and in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish"
(upholding minimum wage laws). In 1949', in Lincoln Federal La-
bor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co.," the Supreme Court
acknowledged in no uncertain terms its rejection of the concept of
economic due process:
In doing so it has consciously returned closer and closer to
the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legis-
late against what are found to be injurious practices in their in-
ternal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do
not run afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition,
or of some valid federal law. Under this constitutional doctrine
the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed
that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket
59. Id. at 589.
60. 198 U.S. 945 (1905).
61. Id.
62. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
63. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
64. 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
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when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions
which they regard as offensive to the public welfare. 5
But the Supreme Court never really sounded the death knell for
the doctrine of substantive due process-it repudiated only the ec-
onomic aspects of the doctrine. As a result, the doctrine would con-
tinue to slither into constitutional jurisprudence, albeit in different
contexts.
C. Devising a Right to Privacy Under the Constitution
By the nature of our constitutional form of limited federal
government, states have been guaranteed wide latitude to enact
laws that affect the health, morals, welfare and safety of their citi-
zens.66 The Supreme Court generally will defer to a state's so-
called police power as long as it does not contravene the federal
Constitution. 7 Since the mid-1960s, however, the Supreme Court
has stricken numerous state laws enacted under the police power
on the premise that such laws violate a constitutionally protected
right to privacy.
The constitutional right to privacy was first discovered by the
justices of the Supreme Court in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Con-
necticut.6 8 Connecticut law made it a crime to use contraceptives
or to counsel others to use them. The Supreme Court invalidated
the law, finding, inter alia, that the penumbras of the first, third,
fourth and fifth amendments create a constitutional right to pri-
vacy that protects traditional marital relationships against state
laws that intrude into such affairs. 9
65. Id. at 536-537.
66. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905); and FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 1-12 (1904).
67. Id.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The so-called right to privacy emanating from
Griswold has been aptly summarized by Professor Lawrence Tribe:
The [right to privacy has] been located in the 'liberty' protected by the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. They have
been cut from the cloth of the ninth amendment-conceived as a rule
against cramped construction-or from the privileges and immunities
clauses of article IV and of the fourteenth amendment. Encompassing
rights to shape one's inner life and rights to control the face one presents
to the world, they have materialized from the 'emanations' and 'penum-
bras'-most recently dubbed simply the 'shadows'-of the first, third,
fourth, and fifth amendments. They elaborate the 'blessings of liberty
mentioned in the Preamble, and have been held implicit in the eighth
amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.
[Vol. 14:69
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In 1973, the Court, in Roe v. Wade,70 invalidated a Texas law
that proscribed all abortions except those necessary to save a wo-
man's life. The Court in Roe determined that state restrictions on
abortion violate a woman's constitutional right to privacy unless
the state can show compelling reasons for its restrictions. 71 The de-
cision in Roe has been likened to the Court's decision in Dred
Scott v. Sanford,72 where the Court decided, inter alia, that the
federal government had no power to prohibit slavery inasmuch as
slave ownership was a constitutional right. 73 The right to own
slaves was nowhere mentioned in the Constitution any more than
the right to an abortion was mentioned. Nevertheless, Chief Jus-
tice Taney relied upon notions of the natural law to find a consti-
tutional right to own slaves just as Justice Blackmun, writing for
the majority in Roe v. Wade, found a constitutional right to an
abortion in the natural law. In each case, the Court ignored the
boundaries of the written Constitution and instead applied its own
idea of natural justice.
In Moore v. East Cleveland,7 the Court again invoked sub-
stantive due process to strike down a city zoning statute. Justice
Powell, writing for a plurality, asserted that "[o]ur decisions estab-
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1308-1309 (2d ed. 1988).
70. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
71. Id. at 155. Finding abortion to be a fundamental right, the Court deter-
mined that a state could never show a compelling reason to prevent an abortion
during the first trimester of pregnancy, except to require that any abortion during
the period be performed by a licensed doctor. After the first trimester, the states
could impose reasonable restrictions in order to protect the health of the mother.
After the second trimester, when the fetus' life becomes "viable," the states may
then assert a compelling interest in the preservation of the unborn's life by pro-
scribing abortion.
72. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
73. "The [liberal contractarian model of constitutional adjudication] was cen-
tral to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney, who wrote the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Dred Scott case and who was a liberal. It was central to the Earl
Warren Court, which used virtually the same language Taney had used." BICKEL,
THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 5 (1975). "[Olnce it is conceded that a judge may give
the due process clause substantive content, Dred Scott, Lochner, and Roe are
equally valid examples of constitutional law. You may or may not like the judge's
politics or his morality, but you have conceded, so far as the Constitution is con-
cerned, the legitimacy of his imposing that politics and morality upon you. Lenin
is supposed to have written: 'who says A must say B.' In that he was logically
correct. Who says Roe must say Lochner and Scott." BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA 32 (1990).
74. 431 U.S. 494 .(1977).
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lish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family pre-
cisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition. '75 In his dissent, Justice White ar-
gued that judge-made constitutional law, employed by the plural-
ity, would intrude into the ability of Congress and the states to
respond to a changing social order: "What the deeply rooted tradi-
tions of the country are is arguable; which of them deserve the pro-
tection of the Due Process Clause is even more debatable. '76
The constitutional landscape began to change in 1986 when
the Supreme Court, in Bowers v. Hardwick," determined that the
Constitution does not confer a right (fundamental or otherwise)
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. In the Court's plurality
opinion, Justice White found no support in the Constitution to
protect acts of homosexual sodomy:
Nor are we inclined to take a more expansive view of our author-
ity to discover new fundamental rights imbedded in the Due Pro-
cess Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law
having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution . . . .There should be, therefore, great resis-
tance to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particu-
larly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be
fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary necessarily takes to itself
further authority to govern the country without express constitu-
tional authority.78
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services,'7 upheld provisions of a Missouri statute regulat-
ing the performance of abortions. The Court found that a statutory
ban on the use of public employees and facilities for performance
or assistance of nontherapeutic abortions did not contravene the
federal Constitution. The Court did not repudiate the holding of
Roe v. Wade, although it did raise questions about its continued
effectiveness.8 1
75. Id. at 503.
76. Id. at 549 (White, J., dissenting).
77. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
78. Id. at 194.
79. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
80. Id.
81. See also Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972
(1990); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
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D. Finding a Right to Suicide in Substantive Due Process
The majority in Cruzan recognized that the Constitution pro-
tects a person's right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. 2
In basing such a protection in the liberty clause of the fourteenth
amendment rather than in a right to privacy, the Court was able to
escape the more.demanding constitutional tests under a right to
privacy analysis that require the finding of a compelling state in-
terest to outweigh the asserted privacy right. The Cruzan decision
suggests that the Court is moving further away from (or perhaps
has abandoned) the concept of a constitutional right to privacy
that was the basis for decisions in Griswold and Roe. But the
Cruzan decision does not suggest that the Court is prepared to
abandon the concept of substantive due process. To the contrary,
the Cruzan decision, by recognizing a right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, is kin to Dred Scott and Lochner in that all of
these decisions were based in part upon substantive due process, a
concept nowhere to be found in the Constitution.
Legal scholars have argued that decisions of the Supreme
Court, such as the Cruzan decision, which are based upon the no-
tion of substantive due process are illegitimate usurpations of con-
stitutional power by the Supreme Court because the doctrine has
no anchor in the written Constitution.s3 The logic of such an argu-
ment is persuasive. But the decision in Cruzan which found a right
to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment can be eschewed on
other grounds as well. That is to say, the Cruzan decision seems
incorrect based upon the standards which the Court traditionally
has applied to determine whether an individual liberty is deserving
of constitutional protection. Under the Court's traditional analysis,
the unwritten liberty interests to be protected are those that are
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"84 and that are "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." 5 Suicide (or the
right to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment) is not such a
liberty interest that has been historically and traditionally pro-
tected against state interference. As the following section shows,
suicide has been historically and traditionally condemned and pro-
scribed by society.8
82. See supra note 17 accompanying text.
83. See supra note 33.
84. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
85. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
86. For general discussions of society's attitudes toward suicide from Biblical
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1. Proscriptions Against Suicide in Early American Com-
mon Law
In the seventeenth century, when Jamestown and Boston were
being settled, the common law of England imposed stiff penalties
for the act of suicide, including the forfeiture of the suicide's per-
sonal estate and ignominious burial. 7 Blackstone, while recogniz-
ing natural rights emanating from the common law, found that the
right to suicide was no such natural right:
This natural life, being, as was before observed, the immediate
donation of the great Creator, cannot legally be disposed of or
destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself, nor
by any other of his fellow-creatures, merely upon their own
authority."
The law of England wisely and religiously considers, that no
man hath a power to destroy life, but by commission from God,
the author of it: and, as the suicide is guilty of a double offence;
one spiritual, in invading the prerogative of the Almighty, and
rushing into his immediate presence uncalled for; the other tem-
poral, against the king, who hath an interest in the preservation
of all his subjects; the law has therefore ranked this among the
highest crimes, making it a peculiar species of felony, a felony
committed on one's self.89
The views of the colonists toward suicide mirrored the prevail-
ing English attitudes.9 0 Most of the colonies imposed penalties for
suicide, and many of them imposed the common law penalties of
forfeiture and dishonorable burial.9 1 Pennsylvania appears to be
the only colony that expressly prohibited the forfeiture of a sui-
cide's estate.2 All of the other colonies appear to have punished
the act of suicide either under the common law or under statutory
times to the present, see generally PORTWOOD, COMMON-SENSE SUICIDE (1978);
STILLION, McDOWELL & MAY, SUICIDE ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN (1989); WALLACE &
ESER, SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA (1981); PERLIN, A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF
SUICIDE (1975); ARIES, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH (1974); AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGIA (V. 1, part 1, questions 1-13)(BlaCkfriars ed. 1969); TOYNBEE ET
AL., MAN'S CONCERN WITH DEATH (1968).
87. See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, Suicide: A Constitutional Right?,
24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 63 (1985).
88. 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *132.
89. Id. at *189.
90. See Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 87, at 64-66.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 66-67.
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law. 3
Civil and criminal punishments for suicide were short-lived in
America. By the end of the eighteenth century, most states had
abolished the penalties for suicide, either by statute or by state
constitution." Why were such penalties abolished? Did the abol-
ishment of the penalties reflect the new nation's belief in natural
rights and individual freedom? Was suicide a natural right not to
be interfered with by the state's police power? Probably not:
It has sometimes been supposed that the abolition of forfeiture
and ignominious burial as punishment for suicide occurred be-
cause the colonists had come to believe that suicide was an indi-
vidual autonomous choice without adverse impact on the rights of
others and society and that therefore government should not in-
terfere with it ... [But the] anachronistic assumption that our
forebearers held and applied a political philosophy derived from
Mills is not borne out by the available evidence."5
In their analysis of the matter, Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone and Balch
have found that the probable reason for the abolition of punish-
ments for suicide was not "because suicide itself was viewed as a
lesser evil or as a human right, but because the penalties punished
the innocent family of the suicide, without in any way reaching-the
real perpetrator of the act."9"
. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, most states had
abolished punishments for suicide, but suicide continued to be
held in disrepute. 7 At the time that the fourteenth amendment
was ratified, twenty-one of the thirty-seven states had enacted laws
making it a crime to assist someone in committing suicide. 8 Of the
thirty states that ratified the fourteenth amendment, eighteen had
laws that made it a crime to assist in a suicide. 9
93. Id.
94. Id. at 67-68.
95. Id. at 68 (footnotes omitted).
96. Id. at 69 (relying upon SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF LAWS OF THE STATE OF CON-
NECTICUT 304 (n.p. 1795)).
97. See Smith, All's Well That Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Ra-
tional Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U. CALIF. DAVIS L.
REV. 275, 290 (1989).
98. Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch supra, note 87, at 76.
99. Id.
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2. The Emergence of a Common Law Tort Remedy for Un-
wanted Medical Treatment
Around the turn of the century, a series of decisions by state
courts recognized a common law right to refuse medical treat-
ment.100 Courts and commentators sometimes rely upon these
cases to contend that suicide (the right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment) is deeply rooted in American traditions such
that it deserves constitutional protection. Yet none of these cases
concerns the constitutional issues relating to the alleged right to
refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. The cases involved state
tort law issues concerning private parties, such as claims of a pa-
tient against a doctor. In the prominent case that involved a claim
of a citizen against the state, the state, not the citizen, was
successful.
In Mohr v. Williams,' a patient sued her doctor on the tort
of assault and battery for operating on her right ear without her
consent. She had consented to surgery, but only to her left ear.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, while granting the doctor's mo-
tion for a new trial because of excessive damages, permitted the
patient to recover from the doctor under state tort law. The court
quoted Pratt v. Davis, °2 an Illinois Supreme Court case with simi-
lar facts wherein a patient sued her doctor for the tort of trespass
to person and was permitted to recover:
Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's first and
greatest right, which underlies all others-the right to the inviola-
bility of his person; in other words, the right to himself-is the
subject of universal acquiescence, and this right necessarily for-
bids a physician or surgeon, however skillful or eminent, who has
been asked to examine [a patient] . . . to violate, without per-
mission, the bodily integrity of his patient by a major or capital
operation, placing him under an anaesthetic for that purpose, and
operating upon him without his consent or knowledge.' 3
100. See Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92
(1914). Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906); Mohr v. Williams, 95
Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905)(overruled on other grounds by Genzel v. Halver-
son, 248 Minn. 534, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957)); But see Jacobson v. Massachusetts,
197 U.S. 11 (1905).
101. 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905)(overruled on other grounds by Genzel
v. Halverson, 248 Minn. 534, 80 N.W.2d 854 (1957)).
102. 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
103. Mohr, 95 Minn. at 268, 104 N.W. at 14 (quoting Pratt, 224 Ill. 300, 79
N.E. 562 (1906)).
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In Schloendorff v. Society .of New York Hospital,'4 a patient
sued her doctor for the tort of trespass to person for removing a
tumor without her consent. The patient alleged that, as a result of
the removal of the tumor, she developed gangrene which necessi-
tated the removal of some of her fingers. Judge Cardozo permitted
the patient to recover, asserting that "[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be
done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is
liable in damages."' 5
In Jacobson v. Massachusetts,°6 Jacobson sued the state over
its requirement that he be immunized against smallpox, claiming
that he had a liberty right not to receive medical treatment against
his will. This case ultimately went to the United States Supreme
Court, where the Court determined that it was within Massachu-
setts' police power to require such an immunization, even against
Jacobson's alleged liberty claim.'0 7 The Court declared that:
the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute
right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.' 8
3. Extrapolating the Tort Remedy Into a Right to Suicide?
By the 1960s, cases implicating a patient's right to refuse med-
ical treatment in non-tort situations began to surface in state
courts, and some of these cases did indeed acknowledge a right to
terminate life-sustaining medical treatment. In Erickson v. Dil-
gard,'0 9 for example, a New York court permitted a competent pa-
tient to refuse a blood transfusion over the objection of his physi-
104. 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
105. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
106. 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 26. Prior to the Cruzan decision, the Supreme Court did recognize
that a person has a significant liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treat-
ment, but the Court had never theretofore extended the protected liberty interest
to life-sustaining medical treatment. See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028
(1990); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S.
584 (1979).
109. 44 Misc. 2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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cian even though his life may have been jeopardized by refusing
the transfusion. In In re Estate of Brooks,"' the Supreme Court of
Illinois also permitted a patient to refuse a blood transfusion on
the basis of the patient's first amendment right to free exercise of
religion. At the same time, other courts refused to allow the termi-
nation of life-sustaining medical treatment. For example, in In re
President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.,' a patient
objected on religious grounds to a blood transfusion deemed neces-
sary to preserve her life. The court, which granted a request from
the hospital to force the transfusion upon the patient, reasoned in
part that the patient's refusal to accept the transfusion might be
deemed attempted suicide." 2
By the 1970s, state legislatures and state courts began to rec-
ognize the problems associated with advances in medical science
designed to keep people alive beyond hope; a problem that had not
existed previously because medical science was not able to sustain
efficiently persons in a persistent vegetative state. As reported be-
low in Part IV, the states reacted with legislation and state court
decisions recognizing that, in some situations, a person should have
the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment. Thus, al-
though there now exists among the states an almost universal (al-
beit limited) right to-refuse medical treatment, such a right is most
recent-and certainly not one that has been "historically and tra-
ditionally protected" against state interference as that phrase is
understood in the constitutional jurisprudence of substantive due
process. American history and tradition are replete with instances
of state intervention to prevent suicide. Even today, the living will
statutes "in no less than ten, states, including Washington, D.C.,
expressly repudiate suicide and euthanasia, albeit with no penal-
ties. No states expressly legalize suicide through either legislation
or constitution," ''  except as provided by living will statutes.
What's more, today, over half of the American states continue to
proscribe the assistance of suicide."1 4 And although the punish-
ment of attempted suicide has occurred only rarely in the United
110. 32 Ill. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
111. 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
112. Id. at 1008.
1.13. Rosenblum and Forsythe, The Right to Assisted Suicide: Protection of
Autonomy or an Open Door to Social Killing?, 6 ISSUES IN LAW & MEDICINE 3, 12
(1990).
114. Id. at 11.
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States, 15 there is reason to believe that it may continue to exist as
a common law crime. 116
As Marzen et al. have concluded:
there is no significant support for the claim that a right to suicide
is so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental'
or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Indeed, the weight
of authority in the United States, from colonial days through at
least the 1970's has demonstrated that the predominant attitude
of society and the law has been one of opposition to suicide. It
follows that courts should not hold suicide or its assistance to be
a protected right under the United States Constitution." 7
In finding a Constitutional right to suicide in the Cruzan deci-
sion, the Supreme Court has exceeded the boundaries of its own
formula of substantive due process. Moreover, if we understand
the Constitution in the manner intended by the framers and ra-
tifiers, the Court's decision in Cruzan-creating a constitutional
right from whole cloth rather than from the text of the Constitu-
tion-exceeds the legitimate boundaries of judicial review and thus
usurps the powers reserved to the states.
IV. THE PRUDENCE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SUICIDE
The state courts and legislatures have recognized the issues as-
sociated with advances in medical technology that serve to sustain
the lives of many people who might prefer to be dead. The courts
and legislatures have dealt with the problems by acknowledging
that there are times when traditional attitudes toward suicide
115. See State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961)(stating that
nearly all courts "agree that suicide is malum in se .... For the reason that suicide
may not be punished, it is argued that this common law offense is now obsolete
and serves no practical purpose for the protection of society. We do not agree." id.
at -, S.E.2d at 855-56.). State v. Carney, 69 N.J.L. 478, 55 A. 44 (1903)(up-
holding a conviction for attempted suicide).
The law had always made an exception from punishment for the insane,
but it came explicitly to regard a suicide attempt as itself evidence, if not
of insanity, at least of mental disturbance for which help was more desir-
able than condemnation. 'Help' meant prevention of suicide and an ef-
fort to treat the cause of the attempt, not assistance in completing sui-
cide. Sympathy for the individual ... emphatically did not mean
approval of the act.
Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 87, at 85.
116. State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 121 S.E.2d 854 (1961).
117. Marzen, O'Dowd, Crone & Balch, supra note 87, at 100.
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should give way and allow someone who is terminally ill the right
to suicide. The states have moved rapidly to develop a body of
statutory and case law that recognizes both the rights of their citi-
zens and the important interests of the state in preserving life
where possible. The states have acted responsibly and effectively in
dealing with difficult issues.
How will the Court's decision in Cruzan affect the develop-
ment of state law? The answer to this question will determine
whether the Court, as a matter of constitutional prudence, should
have ignored the issue presented in Cruzan even though the Court
may have possessed the raw power to decide the issue.
A. State Responses to Advances in Scientific Prolongation of
Life-
The first recognition of a right to justifiable suicide in the
United States appeared in the seminal case of In re Quinlan,"8
decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1976. In Quinlan,
the court permitted the father of Karen Quinlan to remove artifi-
cial respiration from Karen, an act which the doctors believed
would hasten her death. 9 The New Jersey court determined that
the right to privacy under the United States Constitution gave
Karen Quinlan or her surrogate the right to refuse artificial respi-
ration, even though such a refusal would lead to her death. 2 ° (This
right to privacy rationale was repudiated by the New Jersey Su-
preme Court nine years later in In re Conroy). 2' The court recog-
,nized that the state had legitimate interests in preserving the sanc-
tity of human life and in defending the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his or her best judge-
ment."' But after balancing the state's interests against Karen
Quinlan's right to refuse medical treatment, the court found that
Karen Quinlan's interests outweighed the interests of the state."'
118. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
119. Id. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664. Karen Quinlan actually did not die until
many years after the artificial respiration had been removed by court order. It
should be noted that Karen Quinlan's guardians refused to seek the termination
of life-sustaining hydration and nutrition.
120. Id. at 38-42, 355 A.2d at 662-64.
121. See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
122. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976), cert. denied., 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
123. The court asserted that the "State's interest contra weakens and the
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and
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In Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz,"" a severely retarded elderly man who had been hospi-
talized in a state institution for most of his life developed leuke-
mia."' His doctors recommended that chemotherapy not be ad-
ministered because of the low probability of successful treatment
and because of possible side effects and discomforts.12 The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court agreed and allowed the patient's guardian
to refuse medical treatment based upon the "substituted judg-
ment" of the guardian that the patient would not have wanted the
treatment if he were competent and able, to make the decision
himself.127 The court found that a person has a "strong interest in
being free from nonconsensual invasion of his bodily integrity." 2 '
Even aside from the common law doctrine of informed consent,
however, the court also relied upon "the unwritten constitutional
right of privacy found in the penumbra of specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights," citing for its authority the New Jersey Quinlan
case of the previous year. 12 9 The court recognized four state inter-
ests that must be balanced against an individual's right to refuse
medical treatment, including (1) the interest in the preservation of
life, (2) the interest in the protection of innocent third parties, (3)
the interest in maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession, and (4) the interest of the state in preventing suicide (al-
though it is doubtful that there is any difference between the
state's interest in preserving life and the state's interest in
preventing suicide).130 The court balanced the state's interests and
the patient's right to refuse medical treatment (through his surro-
gate) and determined that the patient's rights were more
compelling.1"
The courts in each of the two preceding cases determined that
the decision to withhold medical treatment could be made by the
patient's surrogate even if the patient had not expressed any
wishes about the desirability of life-sustaining medical procedures.
the prognosis dims." Id. 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
124. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
125. Saikewicz, 370 Mass. at 731, 370 N.E.2d at 420.
126. Id. 729-30, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
127. Id. The court so ordered even though Joseph Saikewicz died prior to the
appellate court decision.
128. Id. at 739, 370 N.E.2d at 424 (citations omitted).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425.
131. Id. at 744-45, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
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But in two o1981 New York cases, In re Storar313 and In re
Eichner,33 the New York Court of Appeals rejected the so-called
substituted judgment approach adopted by the courts in Quinlan
and Saikewicz and refused to permit the termination of life-sus-
taining medical treatment without clear and convincing evidence
of the same from the patient.13 4 The court, however, did permit the
termination of life-sustaining medical treatment where the patient
clearly expressed his approval for such action.1"5 In those cases, the
court recognized a common law right to refuse medical treatment
but refused to find a federal constitutional right to privacy.1 36
In In re Conroy,3 7 the New Jersey Supreme Court, the same
court that decided Quinlan a decade earlier, determined that an
individual's right to refuse medical treatment emanated from the
common law and not from any federal constitutional right to pri-
vacy which the court found to be speculative.aR Similarly, in In re
Westchester County Medical Center on behalf of O'Connor,139 the
New York Court of Appeals recognized a right to refuse medical
treatment based upon the common law, not the federal Constitu-
tion. 4° And in In re Estate of Longeway, 4 the Illinois Supreme
Court found a right to refuse medical treatment under the com-
mon law doctrine of informed consent rather than relying on the
uncertain boundaries of the federal right to privacy.1 4 2
At the same time that the state courts began to wrestle with
the complicated questions concerning the termination of medical
treatment for terminally ill patients, the state legislatures con-
132. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 438 N.Y.S.2d. 266, 420 N.E.2d 64 (1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981).
133. Id. Storar and Eichner were companion cases.
134. Id. at 378-79, N.Y.S.2d at 274, 420 N.E.2d at 72.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 376, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 272-73, 420 N.E.2d at 70. "Father Eichner
urges that [the right to refuse medical treatment] is also guaranteed by the Con-
stitution, as an aspect of the right to privacy. Although several courts have so
held, this is a disputed question, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly de-
clined to consider." Id. (citations omitted).
137. 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
138. Id. 348, 486 A.2d at 1223.
139. 72 N.Y.2d 517, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 531 N.E.2d 607 (1988).
140. Id. at 528, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 890, 531 N.E.2d at 611, where the court as-
serted that "[i]t has long been the common-law rule in this State that a person
has the right to decline medical treatment, even life-saving treatment, absent an
overriding State interest." (citation omitted)
141. 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989).
142. Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d at 44, 549 N.E.2d at 297.
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fronted the issue. In 1976, California enacted its "Natural Death
Act, 1 4 3 the first such statute in the nation providing for living
wills.1"" Since the enactment of the California living will statute,
forty-four additional states and the District of Columbia have en-
acted similar statutes.145 Although each of the statutes has its own
unique provisions, there are some general ones that most seem to
contain. For example:
Those similar provisions include: 1) who may make a declaration;
2) the manner of execution of the document; 3) definition sec-
tions; 4) revocation procedures; 5) declarations that the current
wishes of the patient will supercede any previous declaration; 6)
declarations for the transfer of the patient if the attending physi-
cian will not comply; and 7) declarations stating that complying
143. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7185 (West Supp. 1991).
144. A living will is a document in which an individual states his or her pref-
erence to f6rgo life-sustaining medical treatment in the event that he or she be-
comes incapacitated and terminally ill.
145. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010 to .100
(1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-
17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987); CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 19a-570 to -580 (Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501 to
-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2401 to -2430 (1989); FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01 to .15
(1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27
(1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2 701 to
710 (Supp. 1991); IND. CODE §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (1990); IOWA CODE §§ 144A.1 to
.11 (1989); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to 28,120 (1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 311.622 to .644 (Supp. 1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to .10 (West
Supp. 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. '18-A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (West Supp. 1990);
MD. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990); MINN. STAT. §§ 145B.01 to .17 (Supp.
1991); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp. 1991); Mo. REV. STAT.
§§ 459.010 to .055 (Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -206 (1989);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.535 to .690 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to
H:16 (1990); 1991 N.J. Sess. Law Service 247 (West); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to
-11 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 23-06.4-01 to -14 (Supp. 1991); S.B. 1, signed July 11, 1991 (Ohio); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.605 to .990 (1990);
H.B. 5924, signed June 17, 1991 (Rhode Island); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-77-10 to -
160 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1990); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 34-12D-1 to -22 (Supp.
1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -112 (Supp. 1990); TEx. HEALTH & SAF..
CODE ANN. §§ 672.001 to .021 (West Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101
to -1118 (Supp. 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (Michie 1991); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 70.122.010 to .905
(Supp. 1991); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1991); Wis. STAT. §§ 154.01 to .15
(1989); WYo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988). As of this writing, the following
states have not enacted living will statutes: Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska,
New York and Pennsylvania.
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physicians will be provided with immunity from civil and criminal
penalties." 6
In addition to these general provisions, some states now recognize
an individual's right under a living will to delegate medical deci-
sions by proxy to an agent.147 And twelve states allow someone
other than the patient to execute a living will on the patient's be-
half.148 All of the living will acts 'contain provisions designed to
protect medical care personnel from liability as a result of their
following the instructions in a living will. 149 Many states further
protect medical care personnel for refusing to follow the directives
of a living will. 50
There are some limits on the effectiveness of living wills. For
policy reasons, all living will statutes prevent minors and incompd-
tents from executing living wills. 51 More than half of the states
restrict the effectiveness of living wills during a woman's preg-
nancy.6 2 A majority of the living will statutes do not permit the
withdrawal of food and water, and all such statutes require the ex-
istence of a terminal medical condition prior to their
effectiveness. 3
In addition to living will statutes, about half of the states have
enacted durable power of attorney statutes that enable individuals
to designate a proxy to make medical decisions. 54 Other states
permit such a delegation by implication of the existence of a power
of attorney act.
Although different from state to state, the state statutes and
case law can be summarized as follows: First, with respect to in-
competent or severely disabled individuals who are terminally ill or
in a persistent vegetative state and unable to make medical deci-
sions for themselves, there exists a limited right of an individual to
justifiable suicide by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.
Some courts allow a surrogate to refuse medical treatment on be-
146. Note, Comparison of the Living Will Statutes of the Fifty States, 14 J,
CONT. LAW 105, 107 (1988).
147. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858 n.4. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
148. Note, supra note 146 at 111 n.41.
149. Id. at 120.
150. Id. at 118-119.
151. WILLIAMs, THE LIVING WILL AND THE DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY FOR
HEALTH CARE BOOK, 18 (1991).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 14.
154. Id. at 11.
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half of the incompetent patient and others require that the patient
himself or herself make the decision by clear and convincing intent
prior to his or her incompetency.
Second, competent persons who are terminally ill may refuse
life-sustaining medical treatment on the basis of state living will
statutes or on the basis of the common-law doctrine of informed
consent or on some state constitutional law theory. For example, if
a competent person develops a terminal bone disease, he or she
could legitimately refuse to seek treatment, even though the failure
to obtain such treatment could hasten his or her death. The cases
and statutes would not, however, permit a competent person who
is not terminally ill from refusing medical treatment.
155
B. The Effect of the Supreme Court Decision in Cruzan on the
Development of State Law
The Cruzan decision undoubtedly will have significant conse-
quences upon the evolving state laws relating to justifiable suicide.
The most obvious consequence of the Cruzan decision is the effect
the decision may have upon the state living will statutes. These
laws were carefully molded to ensure that the interests of the state
and of the individual are amply protected. The statutes extend
protection to the individual (or his or her family) who chooses to
exercise the right to refuse medical treatment just as the laws pro-
tect the medical personnel who carry out the individual's request.
Importantly, in the execution of living wills, the statutes require
adherence to certain formalities designed to protect state and indi-
vidual interests.
In this regard, the Cruzan decision raises some troubling ques-
tions. The tenor of the Court's opinion suggests that an individual
may have a constitutionally protected right to suicide even if the
formalities of a living will statute are not followed. In her concur-
rence, Justice O'Connor asserted that "[s]tates which decline to
consider. any evidence other than [living wills executed in accor-
dance with the formalities of living will statutes] may frequently
fail to honor a patient's intent." 156 She intimates that under these
155. The California Court of Appeals appears to be the only court which has
permitted a person who is competent and not terminally ill to refuse life-sus-
taining hydration and nutrition. See Bouvia v. Superior Court, 179 Cal. App. 3d
1127, 225 Cal. Reptr. 297 (1986)(the court permitted the termination of artificial
feeding of a quadriplegic patient who suffered from cerebral palsy).
156. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 28.41, 2857 (1990).
1991]
31
Kline: Suicide, Liberty and Our Imperfect Constitution: An Analysis of t
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1991
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW V
circumstances, the courts may be constitutionally obliged to "pro-
tect the patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment."' 57
If the formalities required by the living will statutes do not
establish the legal parameters for decisions to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment, what becomes of the laws themselves? Are the
statutes rendered useless and ineffective? Are they merely supple-
mentary or secondary to the ambiguous constitutional right?
Moreover, since living will statutes offer protection to families and
medical personnel who often make life and death decisions, will
these people be protected under state law if a court (construing
Cruzan) orders them to terminate life-sustaining medical treat-
ment where the provisions of a living will statute have not been
followed?
In those states that have not enacted living will statutes and
where the right to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment is
determined by the state courts, the impact of the Cruzan decision
may be significant. For example, as of this writing, the Pennsylva-
nia legislature has failed to enact a living will statute, even though
legislative momentum seems to be building. It is plausible to assert
that Pennsylvania has bucked. the national trend toward adoption
of such statutes because the legislature has been sensitive to issues
that have been linked to the "right to privacy," such as abortion.
Because Pennsylvania is one of the most anti-abortion states in the
nation, it would be a mistake to conclude that the abortion issue
and the issue of justifiable suicide are not politically connected in
the mind of a legislator confronted with the issues. The Pennsylva-
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor asserts that "[flew individuals pro-
vide explicit oral or written instructions regarding their intent to refuse medical
treatment should they become incompetent." Id. at 2857. To remedy this,
O'Connor suggests that the states enact durable power of attorney statutes ex-
pressly authorizing a patient to appoint a proxy to make health care decisions on
his or her behalf. O'Connor intimates that if a person executes such a durable
power of attorney, such an appointment may deserve constitutional protection
even though there is no state statute authorizing the appointment of such a
proxy. O'Connor's assertions in this regard are puzzling. It is difficult to compre-
hend why a person would be more inclined to execute a durable power of attorney
than a living will. Also, I suggest that many states will not enact durable power of
attorney statutes which delegate health care decisions for public policy reasons
which Justice O'Connor has failed to consider. Those public policy reasons in-
clude the state's interest in preserving and protecting life. One can imagine the
consequences of a health care proxy in the hands of an estranged child of an
incompetent, elderly parent who owns a large estate.
157. Id. at 2857.
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nia legislature's ambivalence on the matter of living wills may be
indicative .of its attitude toward the sanctity of human life. Per-
haps the Pennsylvania legislature (or the legislature of any other
state that has not yet adopted living will legislation) does not favor
the termination of life-sustaining medical treatment except where
nature and science have run their courses. After Cruzan, however,
the Pennsylvania courts may have no other choice but to follow the
uncertain constitutional mandate set forth in Cruzan thereby dis-
regarding the implicit intention of the elected Pennsylvania
legislature.
Other deeply troubling questions arise from the Cruzan deci-
sion. No doubt there exist elderly individuals who may be compe-
tent and in good health but who, for one reason or another, are no
longer interested in pursuing life. Does the Court's decision send a
moral message to these people suggesting that, at some point, life
is worth giving up?158 What about a middle-aged or elderly person
who develops curable cancer but who, relying on the Cruzan deci-
sion, decides to forgo medical treatment in order to end his or her
life? Can it be denied that the decision, so applied, encourages sui-
cide? And what about those people who sign living wills authoriz-
ing the removal of life-sustaining medical treatment only because
the document was placed before them by an estates attorney who
did not take the time to explain the consequences of the docu-
ment? Does Cruzan require that the medical treatment be termi-
nated under such circumstances? Alternatively, if a person exe-
cutes a living will, knowing of its consequences, but later decides
that he or she would rather accept life-sustaining medical treat-
ment, does the Cruzan decision require that the life-sustaining
treatment be terminated?
And where does it all end? Does the opinion suggest that com-
petent adults who are not terminally ill may constitutionally refuse
life sustaining medical treatment? Or, for that matter, may they
refuse food and water? The Court in Cruzan assumed for the pur-
158. [T]he suicide rate for older Americans is almost 50% above the rate
for the general population and rising. Between 1948 and 1981, the suicide
rate for older persons dropped from 28.1 to 17.1 per 100,000. But in the
past several years, the rate has again risen, from 18.3 in 1982 to 19.2 in
1983 to 21.6 in 1986. In addition, it is generally believed that official sui-
cide statistics underestimate the true rate of suicide.
Rosenblum and Forsythe, The Right to Assisted Suicide: Protection of Autonomy
or an Open Door to Social Killing?,6 ISSUES IN LAW & MEDICINE 3, 5 (Summer
1990).
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poses of the case "that the United States Constitution would grant
a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse life-
saving hydration and nutrition." '59 Probably the Court meant to
say that the Constitution would grant a terminally ill, competent
person a constitutional right to refuse treatment, because the
Court later asserts that states are not "required to remain neutral
in the face of an informed and voluntary decision by a physically-
able adult to starve to death."1 0 But such ambiguities may send
the wrong message to those who would challenge state laws that
proscribe suicide.
These questions demonstrate the potential impact of a Su-
preme Court decision that sets policy for a matter that is intensely
personal to the individual and his or her family. State laws con-
cerning the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment can be
changed if they do not respond adequately to the problem. Like-
wise, state courts have before them statutes and common law upon
which they may rely to find a "good" answer in any particular case.
But when the Supreme Court decides issues normally reserved to
the states (such as the regulation of suicide), it makes final pro-
nouncements of public policy that cannot be reviewed except by
the Supreme Court itself. Though the Court may possess the raw
power to find a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining medi-
cal treatment, the Court's involvement in these complicated issues
at this time appears to serve no legitimate purpose and will likely
result in unanticipated and undesirable consequences.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Cruzan found a new constitutional
right to suicide. But for two compelling reasons, the Court should
have avoided entangling itself in decisions relating to the termina-
tion of life-sustaining medical treatment. First, although the Court
purported to locate the new right to suicide in the liberty provision
of the fourteenth amendment, history reveals that the framers and
ratifiers of the fourteenth amendment never intended that the due
process clause would encompass substantive rights. Moreover, a
right to suicide fails the Court's own test to determine which rights
deserve constitutional protection under the due process clause be-
cause such a right is not one that is "deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition." Second, the Court's imprudent interference
159. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
160. Id.
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in decisions to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment comes
at a time when all of the states have moved forward with solutions
to the complex problem. As a result, the Court's decision in
Cruzan is likely to cause unintended complications beyond the
confines of the Nancy Cruzan case.
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